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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On December 4, 2008, the Utah Department of Health (the "Department") issued
an order denying petitioners Orchard Park Care Center, Rock Canyon Rehab and
Nursing, and Trinity Mission Health ("Petitioners") leave to intervene in respondent
Stonehenge of Orem, LLC's ("Licensee") efforts to obtain a license for a 36-bed skilled
nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 470-71.)
As discussed in detail below, this Court does not have jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) because the Department's Final Agency Order denying
intervention and ordering that "the licensing of Pointe Meadows should occur without
fiirther delay and without the need for a hearing" (R. 480) was not a final order or decree
"resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a).
Prior to the issuance of Licensee's license, there was no pending formal adjudicative
proceeding in which to intervene. Instead, under the Department's rules, the decision to
grant or deny a license is an "initial agency determination," defined as "a decision by
department staff, without conducting adjudicative proceedings . . . ." Utah Admin. Code
R432-30-2(2) (emphasis added).
The Department's regulations provide that any "person affected by an initial
agency determination may commence an adjudicative proceeding . . . by completing the
'Facility Licensing Request for Agency Action' form and filing the form with the
Department." Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not request agency
action is this matter either during the licensing process or after Licensee had obtained its
1
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license. Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and
this Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioners' Petition for Review. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2) ("A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available

"); Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2002 UT 91,

^} 23 (reversing and remanding with instructions that cased be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. 1; Whether Petitioner exhausted its administrative remedies by filing a
Petition to Intervene with the Department rather than commencing an adjudicative
proceeding by filing a request for agency action as required by Utah Admin. Code
R432-30-3.
Standard of Review: Whether a party has exhausted its administrative remedies
is reviewed for correctness. Whaley v. Park City Mum Corp., 2008 UT App 234, \ 9.
Issue No, 2: Whether the Department appropriately denied Petitioners' Petition to
Intervene in Licensee's efforts to obtain a health care facility license.
Standard of Review: Whether the licensing proceedings constituted a formal
adjudicative proceeding in which intervention is permissible is a legal question reviewed
for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The Department's
decision that intervention was inappropriate because of considerations regarding the
interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings
(see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(2)(b)) is reviewed for "substantial evidence" in the
2
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record. In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ^f 30, 33 (affirming order denying
intervention because "the request to intervene will materially impair the interests of
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the Commission proceedings").
Issue No, 3: Whether the Department was required to reach the merits of the
statutory claims raised by Petitioners in their unsuccessful Petition to Intervene in
Licensee's licensing proceeding.
Standard of Review: Whether an agency "decided all of the issues requiring
resolution," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(c), is reviewed under a correction of error
standard. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 43, ^| 7.
Issue No. 4: Whether the Department acted within its discretion in granting
Licensee a license to operate a Medicare-only facility based, in part, on Licensee's filing
of a "Notice of Intent" with the Department before the March 1, 2007 Legislative
deadline established by Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4).
Standard of Review: With respect to an agency's "interpretation of the operative
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be
rationally based and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or
are beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Associated General Contractors v. Board of
Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, f 18 (emphasis added); see also Concerned Parents v.
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982) ("Judicial deference is usually accorded an
agency's interpretation of a statute which that agency is charged with enforcing.").
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23, the same section in which the Legislative deadline
appears, states that "[t]he department may make rules to administer and enforce this part
3
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in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act." Utah
Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4). Utah Code Ann. § 26-l-30(2)(b) further provides that the
Department is to "establish, maintain, and enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry
out the provisions and purposes of this title to promote and protect the public health or to
prevent disease and illness

" As a result, the Department's interpretation of Utah

Code Ann. § 26-21-23 must be affirmed unless it is shown to be irrational, arbitrary,
capricious or beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT
112,1118.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann, § 26-1-30
(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the department, it shall have and
exercise the following powers and duties:
(b) establish, maintain, and enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this title to promote and protect the public health or to prevent
disease and illness . . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 26-21-9(1)
(1) An application for license shall be made to the department in a form
prescribed by the department. The application and other documentation requested by the
department as part of the application process shall require such information as the
committee determines necessary to ensure compliance with established rules.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(2), (4) and (5)
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5), a new nursing care facility shall be
approved for a health facility license only if the applicant proves to the division that:
(a) the facility will be Medicaid certified under the provisions of Section 618-503;
(b) the facility will have at least 120 beds; or

4
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(c)
(i) the facility's projected Medicare inpatient revenues do not exceed
49% of the facility's revenues;
(ii) the facility has identified projected non-Medicare inpatient
revenue sources; and
(iii) the non-Medicare inpatient revenue sources identified in this
Subsection (2)(c)(iii) will constitute at least 51% of the revenues as demonstrated through
an independently certified feasibility study submitted and paid for by the facility and
provided to the division.
(4) The department may make rules to administer and enforce this part in
accordance with Title 63 G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply to a nursing care facility that
has:
(a) filed an application with the department and paid all applicable fees to
the department on or before February 28, 2007; and
(b) submitted to the department the working drawings, as defined by the
department by administrative rule, on or before July 1, 2008.
Utah Code Ann, § 63G-4-207(2)
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the presiding
officer determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)(a)
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies
if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required . . . .

S
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Utah Code Ann, § 78A-4-103(2)(a)
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State
Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer
Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(l), (2), (8) and (9)
(1) An applicant for a license shall file a Request for Agency Action/License
Application with the Utah Department of Health on a form furnished by the Department.
(2) Each applicant shall comply with all zoning, fire, safety, sanitation, building
and licensing laws, regulations, ordinances, and codes of the city and county in which the
facility or agency is located. The applicant shall obtain the following clearances and
submit them as part of the completed application to the licensing agency:
(a) A certificate of fire clearance from the State Fire Marshal or designated
local fire authority certifying compliance with local and state fire codes is required with
initial and renewal application, change of ownership, and at any time new construction or
substantial remodeling has occurred.
(b) A satisfactory Food Services Sanitation Clearance report by a local or
state sanitarian is required for facilities providing food service at initial application and
upon a change of ownership.
(c) Certificate of Occupancy from the local building official at initial
application, change of location and at the time of any new construction or substantial
remodeling.

(8) The requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met
if a nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and
paid a fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007.
(9) The requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(b) shall be met
if a nursing care facility complies with the requirements of R432-4-14(4) and R432-4-16
on or before July 1, 2008.
6
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Utah Admin, Code R432-30-2
(1) "Department" means the Utah Department of Health, Bureau of Licensing.
(2) "Initial agency determination" means a decision by department staff, without
conducting adjudicative proceedings, of the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all determinations to
grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or
license, all as limited by Subsection 63-46b-l(2).
(3) "Notice of agency action" means the formal notice meeting the requirements of
Subsection 63-46b-(3)2 that the department issues to commence an adjudicative
proceeding.
(4) "Request for agency action" means the formal written request meeting the
requirements of Subsection 63-46b-3(3) that requests the department to commence an
adjudicative proceeding.
Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3
(1) All adjudicative proceedings under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility
Licensure and Inspection Act, and under R432, Health Facility Licensing Rules, are
formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) The Department may commence an adjudicative proceeding by filing and
serving a notice of agency action in accordance with Subsection 63-46b-3(2) when the
Department's actions are of a nature that require an adjudicative proceeding before the
Department makes a decision.
(3) A person affected by an initial agency determination may commence an
adjudicative proceeding and meet the requirements of a request for agency action under
Subsection 63-46b-3(3) by completing the "Facility Licensing Request for Agency
Action" form and filing the form with the department.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.
This case arises from the Department's issuance of a license to Licensee to operate

a 36-bed skilled nursing facility in Utah County. Licensee obtained its license on
December 18, 2008, after working closely with the Department through the application

7
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process for more than a year-and-a-half. At the time Licensee opposed Petitioners
unsuccessful Motion for Stay filed with this Court, Licensee employed approximately 31
full and part-time employees at the facility {See Affidavit of Cory Robison in Opposition
to Motion for Stay filed in this Court on January 26, 2009 ("Robison Affidavit"), H 21.)
This number has now grown to approximately 80. The total cost of constructing the
facility, which was subject to periodic inspections by the Department as part of the
application process, was approximately $6.4 million. {Id., f 19.)
Petitioners petitioned to intervene in the licensing process on March 25, 2008. (R.
153-159.) The Department denied Petitioners leave to intervene by letter dated June 5,
2008. (R. 392-93.) Petitioners filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Department
on June 24, 2008 (R. 401-10), and the Department referred the issue to an independent
hearing officer, Administrative Law Judge Margaret J. Clark. (R. 416.)
Following additional briefing on the issue of intervention, including briefing by
the Attorney General's office (R. 435-68), the Department issued a Final Agency Order
adopting Judge Clark's Recommended Decision to Affirm Denial of Intervention on
December 4, 2008. (R. 470-81.)
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with this Court and a Petition for stay of the
Department's order with the Department on December 15, 2008. (R. 486-97.) The
Department denied Petitioners' Petition for Stay and issued Licensee a Provisional
License on December 18, 2008. {See Robison Aff, Ex. C; see also Addendum B to
Petitioners' Brief.) Petitioners subsequently moved this Court for a stay of the

8
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Department's December 15,2008 Order, which this Court denied in an Order dated
February 23, 2009.
II.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
A.

A Notice of Intent for the Facility Was Filed on February 28, 2007.

1.

In early-2006, Gary L. Burraston of Deseret Senior Services Consulting

began working with Cory Robison and others (the "Partners") on the development of a
small, skilled, Medicare-only nursing facility in Richfield, Utah. (R. 348, f 2.)
%.

In mid-2006, the Partners hired Mr. Burraston to assist them with the

development of a similar nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 348, ^ 3.)
3.

Mr. Burraston completed a feasibility study for the Utah County project in

July 2006. (R. 3 4 8 4 4.)
4.

After completing the Feasibility Study, Mr. Burraston contacted Joel

Hoffman, a staff member at the Department, to inform the Department that the Partners
intended to apply for a license for a skilled nursing facility in Utah County. (R. 348, If 6.)
5.

Mr. Hoffinan told Mr. Burraston that the Partners should not purchase land,

submit a Notice of Intent or submit a License Application at that time because the
Legislature would be a considering a moratorium on skilled nursing facilities during its
2007 term that could be retroactive to August 2006. (R. 348, ^ 7.)
6.

In January 2007, Marsha Bently, another staff member at the Department,

told Mr. Burraston that the moratorium was expected to take effect on March 31, 2007.
(R. 348, H 8.)

9
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7.

After learning that the moratorium was expected to take effect on March

31, 2007, the Partners purchased land in Lehi for such a facility through a limited liability
company in late-January 2007. (R. 370, f 4.)
8.

Consistent with what the Department had told him, on February 28, 2007,

Mr. Burraston submitted a Notice of Intent to the Department for Medicare Certification
and State Licensing of a 36-bed, Medicare-only facility called "Pointe Meadows" to be
constructed in Lehi, Utah County. (R. 348, f 9; R. 357-58.)
9.

In the meantime, the Utah Legislature enacted a moratorium on new

licenses for skilled, Medicare-only nursing facilities, unless such facilities had "(a) filed
an application with the department and paid all applicable fees to the department on or
before February 28, 2007; and (b) submitted to the department the working drawings, as
defined by the department by administrative rule, on or before July 1, 2008." Utah Code
Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a) and (b).
10.

At the time he submitted the Notice of Intent, Mr. Burraston believed that

the moratorium would take effect on March 31, 2007, because that is what Ms. Bently
had told him. It was only when Mr. Burraston met with Ms. Bently a week later to
submit two additional Notices of Intent that he learned the moratorium had taken effect at
12:00 a.m. on March 1, 2007, and that the Department was no longer accepting Notices
of Intent or License Applications for Medicare-only, skilled nursing facilities. (R. 349,

1110.)
11.

On March 29, 2007, Mr. Burraston submitted a Request for Agency

Action/License Application for the Pointe Meadows facility. (R. 349, If 11.)
10
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12.

Effective May 29, 2007, Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6 was amended to state

that "[t]he requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met if a
nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and paid a
fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007." Utah Admin.
Code R432-2-6(8).
B*

The Partners Begin Construction of a Lehi Facility.

13.

In May 2007, the Partners obtained approval for the construction of a

skilled nursing facility from the Lehi City Planning Commission. (R. 198, U 3.6.) At the
meeting, the Partners were told that any proposed freeway near the location was "7-25
years out." (Id)
14.

The Partners made a substantial investment in the Lehi location, paying for

building and engineering plans, and construction including excavation, footing forms and
the foundation. (R. 370, If 5.)
C.

The Partners Sell The Lehi Land To UDOT Under Threat Of Eminent
Domain Proceedings.

15.

After making this initial investment, the Utah Department of Transportation

("UDOT") approached Mr. Robison, told him that it intended to construct a freeway that
would impact the Lehi property, and threatened eminent domain because it did not want
to relocate a skilled nursing facility. (R. 370, ^ 6.)
16.

In light of the threat that UDOT would take the land through eminent

domain proceedings, the Partners stopped construction immediately and chose to sell the
Lehi land to UDOT. (R. 370,1(7.)

11
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17.

UDOT confirmed in a letter that if the Lehi property had not been sold

voluntarily, it would have taken the land through eminent domain proceedings. (R. 370,
H 8; R. 374.)
18.

The Department has indicated that it also received information from UDOT

confirming that UDOT intended to take the Lehi property through eminent domain
proceedings if the land was not sold to it voluntarily. (R. 349-50, ^ 15; R. 361.)
D.

The Department Approves Transfer Of The Pointe Meadows Facility
To Orem.

19.

After selling the Lehi property to UDOT, the Partners retained

CommerceCRG to search for suitable real estate in Utah County to relocate the skilled
nursing facility that the Partners had planned for Lehi. CommerceCRG identified a
potential location in Orem. (R. 349, ^| 12.)
20.

Before the Orem property was purchased, Mr. Burraston contacted Allan D.

Elkins, the Director of the Department's Bureau of Health Facility Licensing,
Certification, and Resident Assessment, to request that the project be transferred from the
Lehi location to the Orem location under the existing Notice of Intent and License
Application. (R. 349, % 13.)
21.

After some time had passed, Mr. Elkins called Mr. Burraston and approved

the transfer to the Orem location. Mr. Elkins requested that Mr. Burraston formalize this
request in an e-mail, which Mr. Burraston did on November 5, 2007. (R. 349, ^| 14; R.
361.)

12
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In his November 6, 2007 e-mail to Mr. Burraston, Mr. Elkins stated that:
I have reviewed the information that you and UDOT have given me, and
discussed it with our lead Assistant Attorney General. We agree that you
may transfer your application from the Lehi location to the Orem location.
Due to the unusual circumstances of your case, this decision is not to be
taken as precedent.
(R. 349-50,^115; R. 361.)
22.

This written approval from the Department was also required by the bank

before it would approve financing for the purchase of the Orem land and the construction
of the facility there. (R. 350, f 16.)
23.

After receiving this e-mail from Mr. Elkins, Licensee purchased land

located at Center Street in Orem. (R. 350, H 17.)
E.

Licensee Breaks Ground At The Orem Location In January 2008 With
The Department's Approval.

24.

On January 5, 2008, Mr. Burraston spoke with Mr. Bonn of the

Department's Bureau of Health Facility Licensing, and Mr. Bonn did not object to
Licensee breaking ground at the Orem location. The Licensee broke ground at the Orem
location later that day. Mr. Bonn later confirmed in an e-mail that the Licensee had not
done anything wrong by breaking ground at that time. (R. 351,
120.)
25.

Mr. Burraston and Mr. Robison attended the Department's New Provider

Orientation meeting on March 21, 2007. At that meeting, Mr. Burraston received a
checklist with all of the required documents that need to be submitted in order to obtain a
license. (R. 351,1J24, R. 368.)

13
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26.

This checklist contains all of the papers that must be submitted, fees that

must be paid and tasks that must be completed as part of the Department's application for
a license. (R. 368.)
F.

Petitioners' File a Petition to Intervene in the Licensing Process.

27.

On or about March 25, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition to Intervene in the

licensing process and Comments to Licensee's published Feasibility Study. (R. 153-59.)
28.

On June 5, 2008, the Department denied the Petition to Intervene in a letter

from Mr. Elkins. (R. 392-93.)
29.

Petitioners chose not to appeal the June 5, 2008 denial of their Petition to

Intervene, and did not move the Department for a stay at that time. Instead, Petitioners
filed a Request for Reconsideration of their Petition to Intervene on June 24, 2008. (R.
401-10.)
30.

In response to Petitioners' Request for Reconsideration, on August 13,

2008, Mr. Elkins referred the matter to an independent hearing officer. (R. 416.)
31.

As of mid-2008, construction had progressed to the point where the

Department was able to conduct its "4-way" inspection of the project, and approximately
half of the money budgeted for the project was already spent. (R. 503, ^ 10.)
32.

Administrative Law Judge Margaret J, Clark held a prehearing conference

on October 21, 2008. (R. 431.)
33.

Following additional briefing regarding intervention, in a Recommended

Decision dated December 3, 2008, Judge Clark denied the Request for Reconsideration of
the Petition to Intervene, stating among other things that:
14
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Interested Parties are not entitled to intervene in the licensing of Pointe
Meadows nursing facility because of the very unusual facts of this case,
including: the need for eminent domain, the small number (36) of Medicare
beds at stake and a mere 12-mile difference in the initially proposed and
final location of the facility
[A]t this late date, an administrative
hearing that does not directly address the potential licensee, but an
intervenor is unnecessary, contrary to the Bureau's precedent, and not in the
best interest of the public or the Medicaid program.
(R. 475.)
34.

Judge Clark's Recommended Decision was adopted in its entirety by Dr.

Marc Babitz, Director of the Division of Health Systems Improvement, Utah Department
of Health, in a Final Agency Order dated December 4, 2008. (R. 470-81.)
35.

Eleven days later, on December 15, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition for

Stay of the December 4, 2008 Order with the Department. (R. 486-494.)
36.

On December 15, 2008, after passing the Department's final inspection, the

Department verbally informed Licensee that it would receive its Provisional License
shortly. (R. 522, ^ 12.)
37.

On December 17, 2008, Timothy J. McClure, a construction inspector for

the Department, recommended approval of a license for the facility. (R. 522, f 13.)
38.

On December 18, 2008, the Department granted Licensee its license,

permitting it to accept residents. {See Robison Aff, Ex. C; see also Addendum B to
Petitioners' Brief.)
39.

Licensee accepted its first resident at the facility on December 19, 2008.

(Robinson Aff, Tf 16.)
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40.

Following issuance of the Provisional License on December 18, 2008, the

Department issued Licensee a Standard License. Licensee received a copy of its
Standard License, dated January 12, 2009, on January 22, 2009. (Id, 1f 17 and Ex. D
thereto.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Rather than filing a Request for Agency Action with the Department to commence
formal adjudicative proceedings under Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3) to challenge the
Department's handling of Licensee's application or the issuance of a license to Licensee,
Petitioners instead only sought to intervene in the licensing proceedings. However, the
Department's decision to grant a license is not the product of a formal adjudicative
proceeding in which intervention is permissible, but an "initial agency determination"
made by "department staff without conducting adjudicative proceedings . . . . " Utah
Admin. Code R432-30-2(2). As a result, there was no formal adjudicative proceeding in
which to intervene. By not filing a Request for Agency Action under Utah Admin. Code
R432-30-3(3), Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and their
Petition for Review should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction. For the same reason
(among others), the Department appropriately denied Petitioners' Petition to Intervene.
Furthermore, even if the Department erred in denying intervention, such error was
harmless because the Department acted well-within its discretion in interpreting Utah
Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5) to mean that the February 28, 2007 statutory deadline could be
met by filing a "Notice of Intent." The Department's interpretation is rationally based, is
consistent with the statute, and is not "arbitrary," "capricious," or "beyond the tolerable
16
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limits of reason." It would be grossly unfair to penalize Licensee for its justifiable
reliance on the Department's validly enacted rule interpreting the statutory deadline.
ARGUMENT
L

THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Petitioners assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over their Petition

for Judicial Review based on Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a). (Pet. Br. at 1.) That
section, however, only provides that:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction
of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (emphasis added). Petitioners wrongly presuppose
that the Final Agency Order they are asking this Court to review was the result of a
formal adjudicative proceeding.
Licensing proceedings before the Department are not formal adjudicative
proceedings. Instead, under the Department's rules, the decision to grant or deny a
license is made as an "initial agency determination," which is defined as "a decision by
department staff, without conducting adjudicative proceedings, of the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons,
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including all determinations to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or
amend [ a l . . . license . . . . " Utah Admin. Code R432-30-2(2) (emphasis added). In
other words, when Petitioners sought intervention, there was no formal adjudicative
action in which to intervene.
The Department's regulations do provide an avenue for interested persons to
challenge initial agency determinations, stating that any "person affected by an initial
agency determination may commence an adjudicative proceeding . . . by completing the
'Facility Licensing Request for Agency Action' form and filing the form with the
Department." Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not request agency
action is this matter either during the licensing process or after Licensee had obtained its
license. As a result, Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and
their Petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-4-401(2) ("A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available . .. ."); Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2002 UT 91,
*H 23 (reversing and remanding with instructions that case be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies).
IL

THE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATELY DENIED PETITIONERS'
PETITION TO INTERVENE IN THE LICENSING PROCEEDING.
A.

Under the Department's Regulations, There Was No Formal
Adjudicative Proceeding in Which Petitioners Could Have Intervened.

In proceedings before the Department, Petitioners repeatedly argued that they
were entitled to intervene under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207 because the license
application process constituted a "formal adjudicative proceeding" under Utah Admin.
18
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Code R432-30-3(l). This argument misses the mark because the licensing process was
not an "adjudicative proceeding." As already discussed, under the Department's
regulations, initial licensing decisions are made by Department staff without conducting
adjudicative proceedings of any sort. See Utah Admin. Code R432-30-2(2). The rules
further provide that initial agency determinations (including any of the determinations
made by department staff in the course of a licensing proceeding) may be challenged by
persons such as Petitioners by filing their own Request for Agency Action. Utah Admin.
Code R432-30-3(3). Petitioners did not file such a request during the licensing
proceedings or after the Department had issued Licensee its License.
Although the non-existence of a pending, formal adjudicative proceeding was not
stated as the basis of the Department's order denying intervention, "it is well established
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any
ground or theory apparent on the record . . .." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips
Development, L.C., 2002 UT 56, ^} 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Because there was no pending formal adjudicative proceeding in which Petitioners could
have intervened, the Department's order denying intervention should be affirmed.
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B.

The Department Acted Within Its Discretion in Determining that the
Interests of Justice and Prompt Conduct of the Adjudicative
Proceedings Would Be Materially Impaired by Allowing the
Intervention.

Even if the licensing process were a formal adjudicative proceeding (and Licensee
contends it was not, as already discussed), intervention is only required if the presiding
officer determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(2)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
With respect to the second prong of this test, the Department's Order denying
intervention states, in relevant part, that "at this late date, an administrative hearing that
does not directly address the potential licensee, but an intervenor is unnecessary, contrary
to the Bureau's precedent, and not in the best interest of the public or the Medicaid
program." (R. 475.) Findings of fact such as these will be affirmed if they are
"supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Substantial evidence supports the Department's factual findings with respect to the
second prong of the intervention inquiry. First, permitting intervention so late in the
process would have undoubtedly impaired the orderly and prompt conduct of the
licensing proceedings. Petitioners are not without fault in this regard. Petitioners' first
moved to intervene on March 25, 2008, and their Motion to Intervene was denied by
20
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letter dated June 5, 2008. (R. 384-85.) Rather than immediately seeking judicial review,
Petitioners voluntarily requested that the Department reconsider its decision on June 24,
2008. (R. 401-10.)
Petitioners' first request for a stay was filed with Department on December 15,
2008, after the Department had issued its Final Agency Order concerning intervention.
(R. 486-497.) In the meantime, Licensee had completed construction of the facility and
the Department conducted its final inspection on December 17, 2008. (R. 503, <[fl| 10-13.)
Licensee obtained its license the next day. (See Robison Aff., Ex. C; see also Addendum
B to Petitioners' Brief.) Permitting intervention after the facility was constructed, staffed
and ready to accept patients would clearly interfere with the licensing proceedings
contrary to the interests of justice.
Additionally, although Petitioners contend that Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8)
invalidly interprets the application requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(b), they
never challenged that rule using the procedures established by the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act (the "UARA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-101, et seq. The UARA
establishes procedures for challenging the validity of an administrative rule, stating that
%

'[A]n interested person may petition an agency to request the . . . amendment or repeal of

a rule." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-601(2). After exhausting all administrative remedies
under Section 63-46a-12, the "person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of
the rule by filing a complaint

" Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-602(l)(a). Although Rule

R432-2-6(8) was effective May 29, 2007, Petitioners never sought to invalidate Rule
R432-2-6(8) under these procedures, and instead attempted to intervene in a licensing
21
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proceeding months after construction of Licensee's facility had begun. (R. 503, f 9; R.
153-59.)
Other evidence supporting the Department's decision to deny intervention is the
fact found by the Department that an "administrative hearing that does not directly
address the potential licensee, but an intervenor" (R. 475) was not consistent with the
second prong of the intervention statute. In essence, Petitioners are attempting to have
adjudicated the legality of a Department regulation that they could have challenged
outside a licensing proceeding, and much earlier, in a challenge to the rule itself.
Substantial evidence supports the Department's determination that the interests of
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings would have
been materially impaired by allowing the intervention. Licensee respectfully requests
that the Department's order denying intervention be affirmed.
C.

If the Department Erred by Not Permitting Intervention, Such Error
Was Harmless.

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4) provides that an appellate court can only grant
relief on judicial review of final agency action if the petitioner has been 'substantially
prejudiced." Accordingly, Petitioners must demonstrate that the purported error by the
agency was not harmless. Stokes v. Bd. of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
("The requirement of'substantial prejudice" in section (4) manifests the legislature's
intent that relief not be given for an agency error if the error was harmless.").
Even if the Department erred by denying intervention, such error was harmless
because Petitioners' purely legal challenge to the Department's interpretive rule
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regarding the effectiveness of a Notice of Intent filed prior to the statutory deadline lacks
merit. As discussed in Section IV below, the Department's determination that the
statutory deadline established by Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a) "shall be met if a
nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and paid a
fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007," Utah Admin.
Code R43 2-2-6(8), was a rational interpretation of that statute and is not "arbitrary,"
"capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the procedures afforded by intervention would have permitted them to
discover or produce any evidence relevant to this question. Therefore, even if the
Department improperly denied intervention, such error was harmless.
III.

THE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ADDRESS
PETITIONERS' STATUTORY ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT
OF ITS MOTION TO INTERVENE.
In their Petition to Intervene, Petitioners asserted the argument that under Utah

Code Ann. § 26-21-3(5)(a), an "application," rather than a Notice of Intent, should have
been filed prior to the March 1, 2007 deadline in order to avoid the Legislative
moratorium on new licenses for skilled nursing facilities. Petitioners have cited no
authority suggesting that an agency like the Department is required to address substantive
arguments raised by a proposed intervenor when a motion to intervene is denied. In their
Motion to Intervene, Petitioners only requested "that the Department enter an Order
granting Invervenors' petition to intervene in this docket allowing Intervenors to
participate to the full extent allowed by law." (R. 158.)
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In other words, Petitioners did not even request that the Department consider their
statutory arguments before ruling on their Motion to Intervene. As a result, the
Department did not fail to address any issue requiring resolution under Utah Code Ann.
63G-4-403(4)(c).
IV.

THE DEPARTMENT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING
LICENSEE ITS LICENSE.
A.

Under the Department's Regulation R432-2-6(8), the Notice of Intent
Filed on February 28, 2007 Was Effective.

During the 2007 Legislative session, the Legislature established a moratorium on
licenses for Medicare-only skilled nursing facilities, and established a February 28, 2007
deadline for new Medicare-only facilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(2) and (5).
Almost immediately thereafter, the Department enacted a rule interpreting this provision.
Effective May 29, 2007, Utah Administrative Code section R432-2-6 was amended to
state that "[t]he requirements contained in Utah Code Section 26-21-23(5)(a) shall be met
if a nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or application with the Department and
paid a fee relating to a proposed nursing care facility prior to March 1, 2007." Utah
Admin. Code R432-2-6(8).
Without knowing that February 28, 2007 was the last date to do so, Mr. Burraston
filed the Notice of Intent for the Pointe Meadows project that day. Under Rule R432-26(8), the Notice of Intent was timely and the Legislative moratorium did not apply to the
Pointe Meadows project.
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B.

The Department's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5), as
Reflected in Rule R432-2-6(8), Is Not Arbitrary, Capricious or Beyond
the Tolerable Limits of Reason.
1.

The Legislature Has Granted the Department Discretion with
Respect to Enforcement of Its Governing Statutes.

The Utah Legislature has granted the Department wide discretion to interpret its
enabling statute, and in same code section that established the moratorium, provided that
the Department may make rules to administer and enforce that section.
With respect to the statutes governing the Department of Health (Title 26 of the
Utah Code), the Legislature has empowered the Department to "establish, maintain, and
enforce rules necessary or desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of this title
to promote and protect the public health or to prevent disease and illness . . . . " Utah
Code Ann. § 26-l-30(2)(b). Furthermore, in the very section that sets forth the
moratorium deadline, the Legislature established that "[t]he department may make rules
to administer and enforce this part in accordance with Title 63 G, Chapter 3, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act." Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(4). As a result, the
Department is afforded significant discretion in interpreting the Utah Health Code, and
Utah Code Ann.§ 26-21-23 in particular, which established the moratorium deadline.
Thus, with respect to the Department's "interpretation of the operative provisions
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, [its] findings must be rationally based
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the
tolerable limits of reason." Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, % 18
(emphasis added); see also Concerned Parents v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah
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1982) ("Judicial deference is usually accorded an agency's interpretation of a statute
which that agency is charged with enforcing.").
2.

The Department's Interpretation of the Legislature's
Application Requirement Is Rationally Based and Not
Arbitrary, Capricious, or Beyond the Tolerable Limits of
Reason.

The Department's interpretive rule that a notice of intent filed prior to March 1,
2007, satisfies the requirements of Section 26-21-23(5)(a) is not "irrational," "arbitrary,'
"capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." To begin with, the statute does
not define the term "application," and does not suggest that any particular Department
form must have been completed and filed to satisfy the "application" requirement. In
fact, in Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-9(1), the Legislature has granted the Department
complete discretion to determine what constitutes an application, stating that "[a]n
application for license shall be made to the department in a form prescribed by the
department. The application and other documentation requested by the department as part
of the application process shall require such information as the committee determines
necessary to ensure compliance with established rules." Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-9(1)
(emphasis added).
Moreover, the Department's determination that a "Notice of Intent" fulfilled the
Legislature's undefined application requirement (as stated in Utah Admin. Code R432-26) is consistent with the Department's rule that an application for a license is not
complete until the Licensee has submitted all of the documents necessary to become
licensed. Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2) provides as follows:
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Each applicant shall comply with all zoning, fire, safety, sanitation,
building and licensing laws, regulations, ordinances, and codes of the city
and county in which the facility or agency is located. The applicant shall
obtain the following clearances and submit them as part of the completed
application to the licensing agency:
(a) A certificate of fire clearance from the State Fire Marshal or designated
local fire authority certifying compliance with local and state fire codes is
required with initial and renewal application, change of ownership, and at
any time new construction or substantial remodeling has occurred.
(b) A satisfactory Food Services Sanitation Clearance report by a local or
state sanitarian is required for facilities providing food service at initial
application and upon a change of ownership.
(c) Certificate of Occupancy from the local building official at initial
application, change of location and at the time of any new construction or
substantial remodeling.
Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). In other words, the Department
does not consider an application to be fully submitted until all of these clearances are
obtained.
This process is also confirmed in the Department's Information Sheet regarding
Facility/Agency Licensing Requirements, which lists several steps that should be taken
after filing a Notice of Intent but before submitting a License Application, including
paying an application fee, preparing a written program description, submitting a policy
and procedure manual, etc. (R. 338.)
Indeed, the Legislature itself implicitly acknowledged that a complete application
was not required by the February 28, 2007 deadline by establishing a much later deadline
- July 1, 2008 - for the submission of working construction drawings for a new facility.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(b). Under Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(2), an application
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to the Department is not complete until several clearances are obtained that are not
available until construction is well underway or completed, such as the Certificate of
Occupancy. If an applicant needed to obtain and submit those clearances by the February
28, 2007 deadline, the Legislature's July 1, 2008 deadline for the submission of working
drawings to the Department makes no sense. The July 1, 2008 deadline for the
submission of construction plans evidences the Legislature's intent that February 28,
2007 was the deadline to initiate licensing proceedings with the Department, and not a
deadline for the submission of what Rule 432-2-6(2) establishes as a completed
application.
Finally, Petitioners' argument that the Legislature's use of the term "application"
means the Department's form captioned "Request for Agency Action/License
Application" under Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(l) is erroneous. That section states that
"[a]n applicant for a license shall file a Request for Agency Action/License Application
on a form furnished by the Department." This rule does not say that an application
consists only of the Request for Agency Action/License Application form, and such a
reading would contradict Rule 432-2-6(2)'s requirements for a completed application.
This rule merely specifies that an applicant must use the Department's form, nothing
more.
The Department's interpretation that filing a Notice of Intent prior to the February
28, 2007 deadline satisfied the statutory application requirement is based on the
Department's statutory duty to determine what constitutes an application (see Utah Code
Ann. § 26-21-9(1)), its previously enacted rules governing what must be included with a
28
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complete application {see Utah Admjn. Code R432-2-6(2)), and evidence that the
Legislature understood that a fully completed application, including construction
drawings, was not required by the February 28, 2007 deadline. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-21-23(5)(b) (establishing July 1, 2008, as the deadline for submitting working
drawings to the Department). The Department's interpretation of the statutory
application requirement, as reflected in Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8), is rational and
not "arbitrary," "capricious" or "beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Associated
General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, % 18. The Court should defer to the discretion
afforded the Department and not overrule the Department's decision to grant Licensee a
license.
C.

The Department's Rule Interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(A)
Did Not Retroactively Change Or Alter The Statute.

Contrary to Petitioners' arguments, the Department's rule interpreting Utah Code
Ann. § 26-21-23(5)(a), which established the statutory deadline, did not retroactively
change or alter the meaning of that section. Instead, as already discussed, the
Department's rule (Utah Admin. Code R432-2-6(8)) merely interpreted the statutory
language in a manner that is not irrational, arbitrary, capricious or beyond the tolerable
limits of reason. Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ^f 18. Thus, Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988), which
prohibits agencies from attempting to retroactively change or alter statutory requirements,
is inapplicable.
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Petitioners' argument that Rule R432-2-6(8) should not be applied retroactively
because of the general rule that statutes are not retroactive "unless expressly so declared,"
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, is puzzling. The clear purpose of the Department's
interpretative rule is to clarify the status of projects that had filed Notices of Intent prior
to the Legislative deadline. Petitioners' assertion that the rule should not apply
retroactively is not plausible because it would render the Rule meaningless.
Interpreting the Rule in a way that renders it meaningless would be contrary to the
general rules of statutory interpretation, which require the interpretation of "enactments
in a way that render[s] all parts thereof relevant and meaningful" and "avoid[s] an
interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative"
or makes an enactment "unreasonably confused or inoperable." Andreason v. Felsted,
2006 UT App 188, f 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Petitioners'
interpretation of the rule - that it does not apply to filings before its effective date would render the Rule meaningless, superfluous and inoperable. Under the rules of
interpretation, the rule applies to all Notices of Intent filed before the deadline, including
the Pointe Meadows Notice of Intent.
Furthermore, in reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own rules, courts
"defer[] to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable and rational."
Westside Dixon Assocs. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 2002 UT 31,^7. The Department's
interpretation and application of Rule R43 2-2-6(8) to all Notices of Intent filed before the
deadline, including the Pointe Meadows Notice of Intent, is the only reasonable and
rational interpretation of that rule.
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D.

The Department's Decision To Permit The Proposed Facility's Change
In Location Was Reasonable And Well-Within The Department's
Discretion.

There is no statute or regulation preventing the Department from permitting a
party that timely filed a Notice of Intent and License Application to apply the Notice of
Intent and Application to a different location, and Petitioners cite no legal authority
suggesting that the Department should have required Licensee to file a new Notice of
Intent after the Utah Department of Transportation forced it to abandon its selected site in
Lehi for a site within the same county.
Even if there were relevant regulations, in reviewing an agency's interpretation of
its own rules, courts "defer[] to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both reasonable
and rational." Westside Dixon Assocs., 2002 UT 31, If 7. The Department's
determination in this case that the Notice of Intent and License Application are broad
enough to constitute a Notice of Intent and License Application to build a facility within
11 miles of the original location, rather than in Lehi specifically, is "both reasonable and
rational." Id. at 778.
This is particularly true given the unusual circumstances in this case, in which
another state agency, UDOT, demanded the sale of the Lehi property after considerable
resources had been spent developing it. The decision to permit Licensee to seek a license
for the same size facility in the same service area and geographic location was approved
by an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah and is both reasonable and
rational.
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JOINDER IN ARGUMENTS BY STATE RESPONDENT
Licensee hereby joins in the arguments made in Sections I and II of State
Respondent's brief that Petitioners are not "persons" or legal entities eligible to be
"aggrieved parties" entitled to petition for judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G4-403(4), to intervene in agency proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-207(1), or
to bring an original action in a Utah Court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Licensee respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the
Petition for Review based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Petitioners'
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a Request for Agency Action
under Utah Admin. Code R432-30-3(3). Licensee further requests that the Court dismiss
the Petition for Review based on State Respondents' arguments that Petitioners are not
"persons" or legal entities eligible to be "aggrieved parties" entitled to petition for
judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4), to intervene in agency
proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-207(l), or to bring an original action in a
Utah Court.
In the alternative, Licensee requests that the Court affirm the Department's order
denying Petitioners leave to intervene in the licensing proceeding as well as the
Department's issuance of a license to Licensee.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day

)LME ROBERT
Blaine J. Benard
J. Andrew Sjoblom
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
Stonehenge of Orem, LLC

33
#259341 vl sic

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 13th day of August, 2009, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRffiF OF RESPONDENT AND REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST STONEHENGE OF OREM, LLC was served via U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Stephen F. Mecham (4089)
Mark L. Callister (6709)
Callister Nebeker & McCullough
10 East South Temple Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Petitioners
Annina Mitchell (2274)
Utah Solicitor General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Attorneys for State Agency Respondent
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